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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Cari Leone Oxford appeals from her judgment of conviction for burglary and second

She argues, for the ﬁrst time on appeal,

degree kidnapping.

constitutional rights to due process

and equal protection by denying her motion for funds

Additionally, she claims the district court abused

retain an expert Witness.

refusing t0 allow her expert Witness t0 testify at

abused

its

Statement

discretion

Of The

by ordering

Facts

the night of

And Course Of The

August

13,

by

district court

Proceedings

from Bambie Thometz.

hall”

(T12,

p.167, Ls.3-6.)1

2017, Thometz had “gotten off work” and “was arriving home,”

can'ying her eighteen-month old son.

(Tr.,

p.167, Ls.14-23.)

apartment, Oxford “opened her apartment door” and

into the laundry

Oxford argues the

Finally,

trial.

discretion

its

to

restitution.

Oxford was “neighb0r[s] across the

On

that the district court violated her

was

room.” (TL, p.169, Ls.2-8.) Thometz

As Thometz approached

her

“yelling at [Thometz] about not going

tried t0 get inside her

own

apartment and

close her front door, but Oxford “stopped [her] from doing so.” (TL, p.170, Ls.10-14.)

Using “her body and her hands,” Oxford prevented Thometz from closing her apartment
door; Oxford,

still

yelling, “forcibly

(TL, p.171, L.14

— p.172,

she set her baby

down and

started

1

L.13.)

pushed” the door open and entered Thometz’s apartment.

Thometz “believed

“tried t0 stay in front

that [Oxford]

of him.”

(Tr.,

was going

p.173, L.21

—

to strike at” her so

174, L.4.)

Oxford

“punching [Thometz] in the head” and body, kicked her, and placed her in a headlock.

Citations t0 “Tr.” refer t0 the 272-page

transcripts.

The other transcripts

volume

that contains,

in the record will

among

other things, the jury

be denoted according to

their date.

trial

(TL, p.174, Ls.5-14.) After several minutes of being attacked Thometz

down and break

p.175, L.14

free. (Tr.,

— p.177,

L.1.)

Thometz
p.204, Ls.5-12.)

—

knock Oxford

his arm.” (Tr., p.177, L.16

Oxford dragged the screaming baby “across the ﬂoor,” ﬂed with him

apartment, and “shut the door.” (TL, p.177, L.5

p.205, L.11

able to

L.4.)

Oxford then “reached over” and “grabbed [Oxford’s baby] by

— p.178,

was

— p.178,

L.1

into her

own

1.)

called 911 and law enforcement responded t0 the scene. (TL, p.178, Ls.17-18;

The ofﬁcers knocked 0n Oxford’s door and she eventually opened

p.206, L.4.)

child—she was shouting,

Oxford was holding on

“It’s

my son,”

to the

and referred

baby and acting

to the child as

him being

were her own

“Javon Oxford.” (Def. EX.

TL, p.208, Ls.15-18.) She also seemed “confused about the baby’s age,”
a few months old” but later referring t0

as if he

(TL,

it.

in “his twenties.”

at

(Tr.,

2;

times stating “he was
p.208, L.24

—

p.209,

L.2.)

After assuring Oxford they would not “take the baby away” but just wanted t0 hold him,

law enforcement “basically pried [Oxford’s] arms from around the baby,” freed him, and
returned

him

t0

Thometz.

(TL, p.206, L.14

—

p.209, L.6.)

Thometz showed ofﬁcers some

“redness around her neck” from Oxford attacking her. (PSI, p.7.) Pocatello Emergency Services

checked Thometz and

jaw

felt

“some bumps on

the back of her head,” and, based

0n her reports of

pain, “advised her she should respond to Portneuf Medical Center t0 see if she could

possibly had her jaw broken.”

Oxford was arrested

(Id.)

for burglary

preliminary hearing, Oxford’s attorney

which the

have

district court granted.

and kidnapping.

moved

(R., pp.59-61.)

(R.,

pp.31, 36.)

for a Section 18-211

Prior to the

competency evaluation,

The
(Def. EX.

and observed Oxford 0n October

evaluator, Dr. Traughber, interviewed

He reviewed

p.1.)

1,

Bannock County

Jail staf ,”

3,

2017.

“her records” and “information regarding her behavior from

and completed a “mental

exam.” (Def. EX.

status

1,

p2.)

Oxford

“reported an extensive history of mental illness,” including “numerous diagnoses including
schizophrenia, anxiety, and bipolar disorder.”

(Id.)

placed on some antipsychotic medications in the
concentration.

for

some

(Id.)

On

the other hand,

Oxford also reported

jail,”

that she

had “been

Which she thought had improved her

Oxford “indicated

that she [had] not

been psychotic

time.” (Id.)

Regarding the kidnapping

Ms. Oxford interacted

itself,

in

Oxford had the following

to say:

an odd verbal manner during the interview.

She

provided a detailed account 0f the reasons behind her incarceration, indicating that
her charges were completely inaccurate, and that she had been attempting t0

defend the child 0f a neighbor. She provided detail regarding how her neighbor
in “blood magic,” and had been injuring her own child. She had

was involved
further
child.

been told by the boyfriend of the mother

By

had been injuring the
and
“knew”
a child, she
that

that she

listening through the wall, she could hear the distress 0f the child,

Ms. Oxford had been the Victim of “blood magic” as
was the sound a child in distress made when being injured in such rituals.
Throughout the evaluation, her primary focus was 0n ensuring that the
psychologist would leave the jail and report the mother t0 child protective
services, for the beneﬁt of the child. The hope was that child protective services
(Which she had previously contacted and Who had dismissed her claims) might
pay more attention t0 a psychologist. She seemed quite ﬁrm and genuine in her
as

concern regarding the protection 0f the child.
[sic]

Of note,

during the other aspects for

her interview, she was less focused and more confused and disorganized in

her language.

(Id.)

Dr. Traughber found that “[i]t appears that Ms. Oxford

is

currently,

and has

likely

suffered from a mental illness for

some

however, that

difﬁcult to be precise in her diagnosis, due t0 her confusion

“[a]t this point,

and the limitations of

it is

this evaluation.”

time.”

(Id.)

(Def. EX.

1,

He concluded

p.3.)

that

Dr. Traughber also found,

Oxford “[met]

criteria for a

mental illness” (an unspeciﬁed psychotic disorder), was “in need 0f treatment/support,” and was
“not ﬁt t0 proceed” with the case.

(Def. EX.

found Oxford “lack[ed] the capacity

t0

1,

The

pp.3-4; R., p.82.)

make informed

accordingly

district court

decisions about treatment” and entered a

Section 18-211 commitment order. (R., pp.82-85.)

Oxford’s competency was eventually restored and the case proceeded.

Following a preliminary hearing, the

(R., p.100.)

charged Oxford With one count of burglary and one

state

count 0f second degree kidnapping. (R., pp.101-02.)
Prior to

pp.113-14.)

In

Oxford ﬁled a “Motion for Appointment of

trial,

[an]

Expert Witness.”

(R,

she “move[d] the Court for an order approving the retention 0f a licensed

it,

psychiatrist or psychologist to review the facts in this matter, including an interview 0f the

Defendant, and to advise the Defendant regarding her defense in this matter that her mental
health situation

on the date of the incident charged

in this matter

was such

that she could not

have possessed the requisite intent t0 have committed the offenses charged.”
Oxford’s motion cited no supporting legal authority;
“indigency status,

99

(6

simply requested, based on Oxford’s

court approve the Defendant’s request to retain a licensed

the

that

it

(R., p.113.)

psychologist 0r psychiatrist to assist the Defendant in investigating the defense and to testify at

the

trial in this

The

matter.” (R., pp.1 13-14.)

district court

[THE COURT2]

took up the motion

As

t0 the

at a

subsequent hearing:

appointment 0f the expert,

makes some sense, that you want t0 at least explore that
argue at some later date as to whether anything you ﬁnd

I

think that that’s—this
possibility,
is

and

we

can

admissible or not on

the question 0f intent.

So I’m going

to grant that motion,

defender’s] ofﬁce does have,

So—and

we’re in January.

district court t0

pay

for

it

I

So

with one exception:

think,
I

if there is

And

that is the [public

an expert Witness portion of their budget.

would think that—I’m reluctant
a budget amount for that.

t0 order the

[DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER] MR. ANDREW:

THE COURT:

Take a 100k

MR. ANDREW:

THE COURT:
(TL, p.10, L.18

1’11

I’ll

ask—

at that.

ask Dave and Randy about

that.

Okay. Very good.

— p.1 1, L8.)

The deputy public defender representing Oxford
stating that

Okay.

Oxford “intend[ed]

later

to call Daniel Traughber,

ﬁled a discovery request response

Ph.D,” and that the “substance 0f and

basis for Dr. Traughber’s testimony are those facts, conclusions, and opinions set fort

Oxford’s competency evaluation.

(R., p.170.)

”

in

Oxford’s counsel also ﬁled a motion in limine

seeking a variety 0f pretrial rulings. (R., pp.172-80.)
the district court that the public defender’s ofﬁce

Among

other things, the motion informed

had decided

to use its existing expert witness

budget for a different case:

On

January 18, 2018, a motion was ﬁled for appointment of an expert. The
motion set forth the Defendant’s intent to raise a defense against the speciﬁc
intent portions

of the charged crimes based on her mental

alleged offenses.

The motion requested

that the Court

state at the

time of the

approve the Defendant’s

request for an expert to assist in pursuing the defense and t0 testify at

trial.

The

Court denied the motion, indicating that the Defendant access funds allocated to
the public defender’s ofﬁce in
the Defendant

made

its

budget for the retention 0f experts. Counsel for

a request for funds t0 be allocated from the public defender’s

ofﬁce budget, but was denied because the funds were necessary for the defense of
a capital case

(R., p.174.)

Thus, Oxford’s motion explained, she “intend[ed] to call Dr. Traughber t0 testify about
the observations and conclusions he reached during his

Oxford “desire[d]

to

move forward with

trial

competency evaluation.”

(Id.)

Because

with Dr. Traughber,” “both as a fact witness” and

as an expert Witness, she sought a pretrial ruling

on “the issue 0f

his ability t0 testify.”

(R.,

pp.176-77.) The state ﬁled

was

its

and confusing.

irrelevant

own motion

t0 exclude Dr. Traughber’s testimony, arguing that

(R., p.229.)

The

state

went on

produced a competency evaluation Which does not determine the

commit

the necessary intent to

to argue that

ability

Oxford “only

0f the defendant to form

the crime,” and that “Whether 0r not the defendant

to stand trial is irrelevant to the elements in this case.”

it

(R., pp.229-30.)

The

was competent

district court

took

the motions under advisement. (TL, p.26, L.22.)

The following
motions.

It

day, prior to opening statements, the district court revisited the parties’

gave Oxford an opportunity to make an offer of proof; counsel offered “Dr.

Traughber’s [18-21

1]

evaluation,” and noted his “intent t0 just have [Dr. Traughber] testify as t0

and the contents 0f

his interview With her

that, the district court

issued

THE COURT:
actually.

its

And I d0

(TL, p.139, L.19

I

did review this report at

p.140, L.1

note for the record that

I

some length

1.)

interesting, Ithink, that—I’ll read

yesterday,

don’t think Dr. Traughber speciﬁcally

the questions that the defense seeks to have

“It is difﬁcult to

—

ruling:

A11 right.

was addressing

that report.”

one sentence from page

him

It’s

testify to.

3:

be precise in her diagnosis, due to [Oxford’s] confusion and the

limitations of this evaluation.”

Traughber did not View his role in preparing

this

report as determining Whether or not she did have a mental health diagnosis.

He

I

think

it’s fair

to say that Dr.

some vague references actually, to a variety 0f different
Which he seemed t0 review, but he doesn’t—he’s not very
speciﬁc about What those records were, except for some more speciﬁc references
to her behavior in the Bannock County Jail and things that the persons in the
Bannock County Jail indicated that she was saying there.
makes

reference,

historical records

But

his role in preparing this report

not

make

was

to determine her competency.

a formal diagnosis 0f her mental health condition.

reference at

all to

of mind or her
committed.

He

And he

did not

Whether 0r not that mental health condition impacted her

ability to

form an

intent at the time that these crimes

did

make any
state

were allegedly

With

And

as a result of that,

I

do not believe that the report

conclusions

itself or the

there are relevant t0 the issues that the defense seeks t0 raise here, particularly as
to

whether or not Ms. Oxford suffers from a mental health condition, and as a

result

of that whether those instructions should be given and Whether or not he

should be allowed t0 testify concerning her state of mind

So
I

I

at the time.

don’t think his report goes t0 that.

don’t think any

have been made

more disclosure was ever made. I think that disclosures could
some point in time, 90 days ago, as t0 individuals Who may

at

have been treating her for mental health conditions

at the

time that this crime

occurred or allegedly occurred. Those opinions have not been offered.

Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42, 966
P.2d 33, 42 (Ct. App. 1998)] case and the statute that we’re relying 0n 0r referring
I

do think

this falls

mens

rea, that is intent

Evidence, can be admitted. But

And

V.

Code Section 18-2073 which provides

to here as Idaho

issue of

very closely to the [State

I

and

state

don’t think

we have

as a result 0f that, 18-207 does not apply, in

So I’m not going

to allow Dr.

Traughber to

that expert evidence

on the

0f mind, subject to the Rules 0f
such evidence in

this case.

my View.

testify,

and I’m not going

to permit

those instructions t0 be given t0 the jury 0n mental health issues.

(T12,

p.140, L.17

The

— p.143,

state called

L.9.)

Thometz and

the responding ofﬁcer t0 testify.

Oxford did not

call

any

witnesses, but admitted an ofﬁcer’s audio recording of the arrest into evidence. (T12, p.218, Ls.1-

16.)

The jury found Oxford

guilty of burglary

and second degree kidnapping. (TL, p.257, Ls.5-

22; R., p.246.)

Oxford’s presentence investigation showed she had a criminal history with “Violent
tendencies,” had a long history 0f substance abuse issues and mental health issues, and

high risk to reoffend.

(PSI, pp.9-12, 15-20.)

The

district court

sentenced Oxford t0 concurrent

sentences of ten years, with three years ﬁxed, for the kidnapping charge, and

years ﬁxed, for the burglary charge.

(R., p.294.)

The

was a

ﬁve

district court additionally

years, with

two

ordered Oxford

pay $6,072.09

for

“payments made” by the Crime Victims Compensation Program “on behalf of

Bambie Thometz.”

(R.,

pp.224-25, 289.)

Oxford timely appealed.

(R.,

pp.293-95, 299-301.)

ISSUES
Oxford

states the issues

Did the

I.

0n appeal

district court

as:

deny Ms. Oxford her constitutional right t0 due
when it denied her motion for funds to retain

process and equal protection

an expert Witness?

Did the

II.

district court err in refusing to

allow Dr. Traughber t0 testify as an

expert Witness for the defense at trial?

Did the district court err in ordering Ms. Oxford to pay restitution in the
amount of $6,072.09 t0 the Idaho Industrial Commission for expenses
ostensibly incurred by Ms. Thometz for medical treatment?

III.

(Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

The
I.

state rephrases the issues as:

Did Oxford

by not
II.

fail t0

preserve her claim 0f constitutional error by never raising

alleging fundamental error

Has Oxford

failed t0

show

the district court abused

its

discretion

Has Oxford

failed t0

show

below, and

by excluding Dr.

Traughber’s testimony?

III.

it

0n appeal?

the district court erred in ordering restitution?

ARGUMENT
I.

Oxford Never Made Her Claims Of Constitutional Error Below And Has Not Argued
Fundamental Error On Appeal; This Issue Is Therefore Plainlv Not Preserved For Review

It is

well-settled

by now

that “[i]ssues not raised

court 0n appeal, and the parties Will be held to the theory

the lower court.”

Will not be considered

Inc. V. State,

799-800, 589 P.2d 540, 546-47 (1979)).

BV

&

[t0]

3 15,

t0

Through Dep’t 0f Pub. Lands, 99 Idaho 793,

Time and time

again, this Court has declined to

Idaho

Jr.,

_,

320 (Idaho 2019) (“We require ‘both the issue and the party’s position on the issue

be raised before the

trial

court for

it

t0

be properly preserved for appeal.’”); State

165 Idaho 338, 445 P.3d 147, 151 (2019) (noting “[t]his
that “the Territorial

is

not a

new

no point

it

V.

Wolfe,

approach,” and pointing out

Supreme Court of Idaho recognized over 150 years ago”

unfair for a party to g0 into court and slumber, as

ruling, present

this

396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017)

consider claims that parties failed to raise below. See, 1g; State V. Gonzalez,

450 P.3d

by

upon Which the case was presented

State V. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275,

Heckman Ranches,

(quoting

below

that

it

“is

manifestly

were, 0n his defense, take no exception t0 the

for the attention of the court,

and seek

to present his defense, that

was

never mooted before, t0 the judgment 0f the appellate court. Such a practice would destroy the

purpose 0f an appeal and make the [S]upreme [C]ourt one for deciding questions of law in the
ﬁrst instance”) (quoting Smith V. Sterling,

1

Idaho 128, 131 (1867)); State

Idaho 95, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“We Will not hold that a
decision on an issue or a party’s position on an issue that

address.

.

..

it

trial

V.

Gonzalez, 165

court erred in

did not have the opportunity to

A groomed horse is expected 0n appeal, but a different horse is forbidden”)

10

making a

Oxford claims,

on appeal,

for the ﬁrst time

that

by “den[ying] her request

for funds t0

retain” an expert, the district court violated her constitutional2 rights to due process

This claim

(Appellant’s brief, p.11.)

protection.

is

not preserved.

and equal

Oxford never cited any

constitutional authority in her request for district court funding for an expert; in fact, her request

for funding did not cite

district court’s

any authority

ﬁmding decision

district court rule

at all.

(R., pp.1 13-14.)

violated the constitution or

0n any constitutional

Parties are held to the issues they raise below,

these issues

below—much

(m

issues.

t0

error.

E

(2010); State V. Miller, 165 Idaho 115,

so.

Oxford has not bothered

in

error—much

State V.

on them—they

Peg,

to articulate this Court’s

are not preserved for review.

150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979
133 (2019). She has chosen not t0 do

fundamental error standard,

raise issues for the ﬁrst time in a

Reply

V. State,

&

&

Welfare, 151 Idaho 310, 321, 256 P.3d 718, 729 (2011); The David

much

less has

(E Appellant’s

fundamental error argument has been waived. I.A.R. 35(a)(4); Patterson

brief,

Though not expressly

set forth in her statement

that the district court’s

Marvel Benton

Tr. V.

pp.1 13-14.)

amounted

to

T0

Like her constitutional claim,

all

times Oxford argues

§

19-852(a)(2).

(E

this issue is not preserved;

below

that the district court’s funding decision violated Section 19-852(a)(2).

(R.,

the extent the district court’s denial 0f Oxford’s request for public funds

(ﬂ

an implicit ruling on Section 19-852(a)(2), preserving a claim of statutory error
436 P.3d 683, 689 (2019), Oxford fails t0 show any error 0n the

State V. Jeske, 164 Idaho 862,

merits for

this

at

funding decision also violated Idaho Code

Appellant’s brief, pp.8-9.)

Oxford never argued

of the issues 0n appeal,

any

Dep’t 0f Health

McCarty, 161 Idaho 145, 155, 384 P.3d 392, 402 (2016) (“In order to be considered by

2

at

that the district court’s funding decision

_, 443 P.3d 129,

Because parties cannot

less did the

L.18 — p.11, L.10; R., p.174.)

she shown, or even argued, that the district court committed fundamental error.

brief, pp.8-13.)

claimed that the

and because Oxford never raised or even hinted

less did the court rule

fundamental

was even

Tr., p.10,

Oxford could have conceivably argued 0n appeal

amounted

And Oxford never

the reasons articulated herein.

11

Court, the appellant

required t0 identify legal issues and provide authorities supporting the

is

arguments in the opening brief”).
Alternatively, even if a fundamental error claim

Oxford does not come close
979;

m,

165 Idaho

at

to

showing fundamental

_, 443 P.3d

at 133.

error.

had inadvertently been made here,

m,

150 Idaho

(m Appellant’s brief,

p.

1 .)

The

227, 245 P.3d at

Oxford cannot show the court committed a

constitutional Violation, ﬁrst because the court’s “den[ial]” of Oxford’s

not a denial.

at

district court

clear

“motion for ﬁmds” was

did not deny Oxford public funding;

simply instructed Oxford that her public funds would need t0 come from the public defender’s

it

existing expert Witness budget. (T12, p.1

1,

Ls.1-8.)

Oxford made her request

in January, after

all,

and “the [public defender’s] office” had “an expert Witness portion 0f their budget.” (TL, p.10,
Ls.23 — p.1

1,

L.1.)

And

it

was ultimately

who

the public defender, not the district court,

(ﬂ

concluded that those ﬁmds were better spent in a different case.

Tr., p.1 1, Ls.1-8; R.,

p.174

Oxford’s counsel, a deputy public defender, “made a request for funds to be allocated

(stating

from the public defender’s ofﬁce budget, but was denied because the funds were necessary
the defense 0f a capital case”)).

with her

own counsel—Which

Even assuming
t0

show any

expert.

error.

As

Thus, Oxford’s true complaint

chose not to use the public funds

the funding decision can be

it

Oxford found3 an expert

blamed on the

t0 testify at trial: Dr. Traughber,

(R., pp.176-77.)

Oxford’s chosen expert, Dr. Traughber, did not testify

on the motion

in limine.

it

not With the district court, but

already had for this case.

district court,

turns out, the funding decision did not prevent

conducted Oxford’s 18-211 evaluation.

3

is

The propriety of this

ruling

herein.

12

is

Oxford

Who was

due

still fails

Oxford from acquiring an
the psychologist

Oxford undoubtedly had a

at trial

for

right to

Who
any

t0 the district court’s ruling

a separate issue, addressed in section

ILC

necessary “expert assistance at public expense,” but she did not “have a constitutional right

choose an [expert] of

[her] personal liking.’”

1082, 1097 (Ct. App. 2016) (citing

Ake

V.

State V. Brackett, 160 Idaho 619, 634,

more

470 U.S.

at

t0 her liking.

This

is

show

not enough t0

is

that she

was unable

to hire

some other

a clear constitutional Violation.

E

A_ke,

83 (ﬁnding n0 “constitutional right t0 choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or

t0 receive funds to hire his

own”

.

Much

less

can Oxford show that the choice t0 use Dr.

Traughber, as opposed to some other expert, was not

outcome of the
at

377 P.3d

Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985)). Because Oxford

ultimately secured an expert Witness, her essential gripe

expert,

‘to

trial

tactical, or that

show ﬁmdamental

proceedings,” as she must do to

it

“actually affected the

error.

m,

165 Idaho

_, 443 P.3d at 134.
Oxford’s constitutional claim

ﬁmdamental

error.

Even

if

is

plainly not preserved and she has

waived any claim of

a reviewable fundamental error claim had been made,

every prong on the merits. In any event, Oxford

fails t0

show

it

would

fail

on

error.

II.

Oxford

Fails

T0 Show The

District

Court Abused

Its

Discretion Excluding Dr. Traughber’s

Testimony
A.

Introduction

Prior t0

trial,

Oxford moved the

district court for

an order allowing the testimony 0f Dr.

Traughber, both as a fact and expert witness, “0n the issue of whether she had the requisite
intent” t0

commit kidnapping and

burglary.

(R., pp.176-77.)

such testimony after concluding Dr. Traughber,
after the arrest,

The

district court

Who examined Oxford more

excluded any

than seven weeks

could not testify about the relevant issue: “her state of mind at the time” of the

kidnapping. (TL, p.141, Ls.18-25 (emphasis added).)
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Oxford claims

this

was an abuse 0f

discretion, arguing that “Dr.

testiﬁed regarding his clinical diagnosis of Ms. Oxford,

which

is

Traughber could have

a concept beyond the

common

experience of most jurors, and would have assisted the jurors in evaluating the evidence.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.16.)

A review

been inadmissible and that the

Standard

B.

When

of Dr. Traughber’s report shows his testimony would have

district court correctly

the appellate court reviews the

Dulanev

(2002)).

trial

boundaries 0f

reached

ﬂ,

trial

court’s evidentiary rulings, the appellate court

State V. Jones, 160 Idaho 449,

Alphonsus Reg’l Med.
a

trial

Ctr.,

137 Idaho 160, 163-64, 45 P.3d 816, 819-20

court abused

its

discretion, the appellate court considers

its

discretion

by an

and consistently with applicable

exercise of reason.”

Li. (quoting

Perry

V.

acted within the

and whether

it

Magic Valley Reg’l Med.
is

relevant

is

reviewed de

Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993).

The District Court Properly Excluded The Testimony Of Dr. Traughber Because It Would
Have Been Irrelevant, And Because He Lacked Foundation To Opine On Her Intent At
The Time Of The Crime
“Relevant Evidence” means “evidence having any tendency t0

fact that is

it

it

legal standards,

134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000)). Whether evidence
V.

375 P.3d 279 (2016)

court “correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether

decision

its

novo. State

C.

V. St.

To determine Whether

Whether the

it.

Of Review

applies an abuse 0f discretion standard.

(citing

excluded

make

the existence 0f any

0f consequence to the determination 0f the action more probable or

would be Without

the evidence.”

I.R.E. 401.

The

probable than

appellate court reviews questions of

relevance de novo. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 764, 864 P.2d at 602.
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less

The

admissibility of expert testimony

is

governed by Idaho Rule of Evidence 702, Which

provides:

If scientiﬁc, technical, or other specialized

knowledge

Will assist the trier 0f fact

to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualiﬁed as

expert
in the

by knowledge, skill, experience,
form of an opinion or otherwise.

“To be admissible,

the expert’s testimony

0r to determine a fact in issue.”

beyond the common

State V. Arrasmith, 132 Idaho 33, 42,

The
mental

district court

must

assist the trier

testify thereto

0f fact t0 understand the evidence

understood

“The function 0f the expert

sense, experience

966 P.2d 33, 42
that,

(Ct.

is

770 (2007)

to provide testimony

on

and education of the average juror.”

App. 1998)

(citations omitted).

pursuant t0 Idaho Code § 18-207, evidence of Oxford’s

was “not a defense” 0r “an absolute defense”

state

may

State V. Joslin, 145 Idaho 75, 81, 175 P.3d 764,

(quotations omitted); see also I.R.E. 702.

subjects that are

training, 0r education,

an

t0 the charges against her.

p.10, Ls.1 1-12); see LC. § 18-207(1) (“Mental condition shall not be a defense t0

(7/2/18 TL,

any charge” of

criminal conduct). But the district court also correctly pointed that Oxford could have presented

“evidence that goes t0 the question 0f [‘]can the defendant form the requisite mental intent[‘].”

(7/2/18 Tr., p.10, Ls.6-9.)

defense 0f insanity

is

Indeed, Idaho’s statutes and “precedent hold[] that an independent

not required, and that evidence of mental illness can

the intent element of a crime.”

ﬂ alﬂ

LC.

§ 18-207(3).

State V. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 130,

still

be used to rebut

267 P.3d 709, 717 (201

Both second degree kidnapping and burglary have

1);

intent elements.

LC. §§ 18—1401; 18-4501(1).

The

district court

concluded, however, that Dr. Traughber’s testimony could not have

been used for the permissible purpose 0f rebutting the
[D11

state’s intent evidence:

Traughber’s] role in preparing this report was to determine [Oxford’s]

competency.

And he

did not

make

a formal diagnosis 0f her mental health

15

condition.

He

make any

did not

reference at

health condition impacted her state of

mind

all t0

Whether or not that mental

or her ability t0 form an intent at the

time that these crimes were allegedly committed.

(T12,

p.141, Ls.1 1-17.)

The

district court

concluded that there was an insufﬁcient “foundation and basis for

allowing Dr. Traughber t0 testify as t0 [Oxford’s[ mental health conditions or the speciﬁc intent
requirements,” and that Dr. Traughber’s “report itself 0r the conclusions there” were not
“relevant t0 the issues that the defense seeks to raise here.” (TL, p.141, L.18

A

review 0f the record shows that

seven weeks after the kidnapping.

this

was

(R., p.23; Def.

correct.

EX.

1,

p.1.)

on Oxford’s mental health 0n the night 0f the crime, nor did
mental

illness.

(E Def.

EX.

1.)

kidnapping or Whether any mental

The

report gave

it

and has likely suffered from a mental

unspeciﬁed psychotic disorder.

“Oxford does meet

criteria for

(Def. EX.

1,

The

pp.3-4.)

And

report contained

(E

id.)

1,

p.3.)

“it

some

intent during the

appears that Ms. Oxford

shows

conclude Oxford was not competent

that While Dr.

at the

is

time,” and that she had an

While Dr. Traughber concluded that

a mental illness” he conceded that “[a]t this point,

In sum, the report

no opinions

Furthermore, the report’s

be precise in her diagnosis, due t0 her confusion and the limitations 0f
EX.

1.)

blame the crimes 0n any particular

only stated that
illness for

L.1

Dr. Traughber examined Oxford

no opinion on Oxford’s

illness affected that intent.

references to Oxford’s mental health were vague;

currently,

it

— p. 142,

it is

difﬁcult to

this evaluation.”

(Def.

Traughber had enough information t0

time 0f the evaluation, he lacked the foundation to

deﬁnitively weigh in 0n Oxford’s mental state seven weeks earlier.

It

also

shows Dr. Traughber

could not offer any testimony 0n the relevant question: Whether Oxford lacked intent t0 commit
the crimes.
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Oxford argues 0n appeal

that the district court

Traughber’s testimony. (Appellant’s
“the district court

evaluation,

crimes.”

9

was

brief, pp.13-17.)

abused

its

discretion

by excluding Dr.

However, Oxford concedes on appeal

correct t0 conclude that Dr. Traughber could not testify that, based

Ms. Oxford ‘Was unable

form the speciﬁc

to

intent necessary t0

(Appellant’s brief, p.16 (citing Tr., p.22, Ls.12-21.)

relegates Dr. Traughber’s testimony

that

0n

his

commit these

This concession necessarily

At

beyond the bounds 0f relevance.

best, Dr.

Traughber

could only testify as to Oxford’s generalized mental health—Which could not have constituted a
defense to the

crime—and he could not

testify

“0n the issue of any

state

of mind which [was] an

element of the offense”—the intent element.

The only items

in the report arguably bearing

were Oxford’s statements about wanting
Def. EX.

1,

p.2.)

to shield

on Oxford’s

intent during the kidnapping

Thometz’s child from “blood magic.”

But these statements only showed Oxford did intend

(E

to kidnap a child, albeit for

deluded reasons. In other words, even granting that Oxford was hallucinating that “blood magic”

was

afoot in the apartment next door, this

own

explanation, she intended t0

remove

still

would not have negated her

the child

from the apartment,

intent.

to get

1,

state’s

p.6); I.C. § 18-4501(1).4

Even

still

the

(R., p.102; Def.

not have “rebutﬂedj

evidence offered t0 prove criminal intent or mens rea”—it could only have bolstered

Delling, 152 Idaho at 130,

4

Thus, Traughber’s testimony could

Oxford’s

him away from

imaginary “rituals,” and intended to “keep” 0r “conceal” him from his parent.
EX.

By

if these

statements

267 P.3d

at

it.

717 (emphasis added).

would have been admissible

their exclusion

was harmless,

insofar as

they cut directly against Oxford’s theory of the case at trial—that Oxford was suffering from a
delusion that the child

was her baby, not Thometz’s. (TL, p.246, Ls.19-25.)
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In sum, because Dr. Traughber

had nothing

to offer

0n the only permissible basis

for

discussing Oxford’s mental health, and because he lacked foundation t0 offer any relevant
testimony, the district court properly excluded

him from

testifying at

trial.

III.

Oxford

Fails

T0 Show The

The decision whether
court’s discretion.

restitution

District Court Erred In Ordering Restitution

t0 order restitution

and

in

State V. Hill, 154 Idaho 206, 211,

award “Will not be disturbed

if

What amount

is

committed

296 P.3d 412, 417

(Ct.

App. 2013).

supported by substantial evidence”; that

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept t0 support a conclusion.” State

to the trial

is,

A

“relevant

Nelson, 161 Idaho

V.

692, 697, 390 P.3d 418, 423 (2017) (quoting State V. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 885, 292 P.3d 273,

276 (2013)).

The

state

submitted a restitution request from the Crime Victims Compensation Program,

“requesting restitution for payments” in the amount of $6,072.69

Thometz.”
p.287.)

(R., pp.224-25.)

The

district court

Oxford subsequently objected

t0

ordered restitution in the requested amount. (R.,

relate t0 the offenses for

ﬁnd

for medical expenses.

emergency room

The

None 0f it’s

after she

that the bills paid

Which the Defendant was found

related to the charges in this matter, that such injuries

criminal conduct.” (R., p.291.)

arguing that “there

the restitution order,

supporting information upon Which the Court can

Commission

“made 0n behalf of Bambi

state later

It

the defendant.
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no

the Industrial

guilty or, if the bills are

directly related t0 the defendant’s

explained that the total

for mental health.

was beaten by

were

by

is

bill

of $6,072.09 was “just

was When Ms. Thometz had
She had

to

d0 some

CT

to

go

to the

scans.” 2/7/19

TL,

p.2,

L.25 — p.3, L.4;

ﬂ alﬂ

R., p.225

(showing payments made

to

“ID EM-I Medical

Services, P.C.,” “Medical Imaging Assoc,” and “Portneuf Medical Center”).

The

district court

concluded the

state’s request

adequate support”; in particular, the court wanted t0

was “insufﬁcient

know “What

bills

as far as providing

were incurred

at

What

times and for what circumstances” and “what amounts were actually paid by the Industrial

Commission.” (2/7/19
t0 the

Tr., p.3,

The

Ls.10-23.)

state indicated that

could “have that submitted

it

Court by next week” and “should be able t0 get that information t0 the Court.” (2/7/ 19 TL,

p.5, Ls.12

—

Based 0n

p.6, L.11.)

this the district court overruled

sustained the restitution order “With the caveat that

[THE COURT2]

I

I

Oxford’s objection and

want the information

I’ve asked for”:

think that there’s no reason that that information could not be

supplied Within two weeks.

[PROSECUTOR] MS. GRAHAM:

Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT:

So I’ll give you two weeks
today? The 7th—215t of February.

And you

to

do

that.

can have a week t0 ﬁle a subsequent obj ection

MR. ANDREW:

No

if you

later

than—what’s

wish, Mr. Andrew.

Okay.

THE COURT: And

But for now, the
0n the rulings I’ve made today. I’ll make a
submissions are made, no later than the 28th 0f February.
I’ll

deal With that at that point in time.

objection’s overruled conditioned

ﬁnal ruling after

— p.12,

(2/7/19 Tr., p.10, L.23

The

state did

restitution order

Oxford

all

L.13.)

not submit any additional restitution information

0f $6,072.69 was

fails to

show

to

and the original

left in place.

a reviewable error

supporting information to the district court

and request the Court

(ﬂ R.),

0n appeal. The

state admittedly did

not submit

(ﬂ R.), but neither did Oxford renew her objection

withdraw the conditional

19

restitution order

(ﬂ 2/7/19 Tr., p. 12, Ls.6-8).

Because Oxford never requested a “ﬁnal ruling” as invited by the
this issue

can be raised on appeal.

C_f.,

Krempaskv

V.

she

district court,

Nez Perce

Ctv. Planning

fails to

&

show

Zoning, 150

Idaho 231, 236, 245 P.3d 983, 988 (2010) (holding “that in order for an issue t0 be raised on
appeal, the record

error”;

ﬂ

must reveal an adverse ruling Which forms the basis

also State V. Pickens, 148 Idaho 554, 557,

for

224 P.3d 1143, 1146

an assignment of

(Ct.

App. 2010) (“In

order for an issue t0 be raised 0n appeal, the record must reveal an adverse ruling that forms the

basis for the assignment of error.”).

In any event, even if the district court abused

restitution order in place, the proper

the order 0f restitution.”

discretion

its

remedy would be a limited remand

(E Appellant’s

brief, p.21.)

The

by leaving
as

opposed

limited

(2/7/19 Tr., p.5, L.17

remand

—

p.6, L.11.)

t0 “Vacat[ing]

state assured the district court that

could “have that information submitted to the Court” in a week, and that

happen.”

the original

The appropriate remedy,

it

it

could “make that

therefore,

would be a

for the state t0 provide that information to the district court.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the judgment 0f conviction and sentence.

Alternatively, the state requests this Court

remand

for the limited purposes of reviewing the

state’s restitution request.

DATED this 26th day of November, 2019.

/s/

Kale D. Gans

KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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